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sumption that "everyone is supposed to know the law." See *Aldrich* v. *R. R. Co.*, 95 S. C. 427, 79 S. E. 316; *Kansas C. S. R. Co.* v. *Carl*, 227 U. S. 639. The maxim *ignorantia legis neminem excusat*, while often incorrectly expressed, is usually rightly applied. *Chicago, etc., R. Co.* v. *Kirby*, 225 U. S. 155. Though ignorance of the law excuses no one, everyone is not supposed to know the law. There is no such rule in law or equity. *Ryan* v. *State*, 104 Ga. 78, 30 S. E. 678; *Black* v. *Ward*, 27 Mich. 191, 15 Am. St. Rep. 162. It may be true that there is a prima facie presumption that everyone knows the law but this fails upon proof of positive misrepresentation relied on in good faith. *O'Neil* v. *Lake Superior, etc., Co.*, 63 Mich. 690, 30 N. W. 688.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—INTERSTATE COMMERCE—EFFECT OF STATE ANTI-TRUST LAWS.—The plaintiff in one State sold certain goods to the defendant in another, under a contract fixing the retail price of the goods, prohibiting the vendor from selling any other goods, and restricting sales to one county. In defense to an action to recover the purchase price of the goods, the vendee claimed the contract to be invalid under the State anti-trust laws. *Held*, the transaction is not affected by State anti-trust laws, since it involves interstate commerce. *Watkins Medical Co.* v. *Holloway* (Mo.), 168 S. W. 290.

It is well settled that contracts of sale only, in restraint of trade, between parties of different States, involve interstate commerce and are not affected by State anti-trust laws. *Hadley Dean Plate Glass Co.* v. *Highland Glass Co.* (C. C. A.), 143 Fed. 242; *Westmoreland Specialty Co.* v. *Missouri Glass Co.*, 169 Mo. App. 368, 152 S. W. 387. But, by the better view, where a contract involving interstate commerce, affects the subject-matter of the transaction when it has lost its character as interstate commerce, the contract is subject to State laws. *Watkins Medical Co.* v. *Johnson* (Tex.), 162 S. W. 394; *Fuqua* v. *Pabst Brewing Co.*, 90 Tex. 298, 38 S. W. 29, 35 L. R. A. 241. Thus where a combination was seeking to control both interstate and intrastate markets as to its products, the intrastate monopoly was declared subject to the State laws, though the products in question were shipped into the State from without. *Standard Oil Co. of Kentucky* v. *State* (Miss.), 65 South. 468. And in this connection, goods the subject of interstate commerce, become subject to State regulation in the bands of the original importer, when offered for sale by him in broken packages or by retail. *Fuqua* v. *Pabst Brewing Co., supra; Leisy* v. *Hardin*, 135 U. S. 100.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—POLICE POWER—MEDICINE AND SURGERY.—A state statute authorized the State Board of Medical Examiners to revoke the license of any physician who should publish any advertisement relative to diseases of the sexual organs. *Held*, the statute is in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. *Chenoweth* v. *State Board of Medical Examiners* (Col.), 141 Pac. 132. See NOTES, p. 150.

DAMAGES—PHYSICAL EXAMINATION—POWER TO ENFORCE.—The plaintiff was injured while on defendant's train. The defendant made applica-

tion to the court to compel the plaintiff to submit to a physical examination by physicians appointed by the court. *Held*, the court has no power to compel such examination. *Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Robinson* (Miss.), 65 South 241.

The principal case has some support. *Union Pac. R. Co.* v. *Botsford*, 141 U. S. 250; *Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co.* v. *Melson* (Okla.), 134 Pac. 388. But by the weight of authority in an action for damages for an injury, the plaintiff can in the discretion of the court, be compelled to submit to a physical examination. *Illinois Cent. R. Co.* v. *Beeler* (Ky.), 135 S. W. 305; *Denver Tramway Co.* v. *Roberts*, 43 Col. 522, 96 Pac. 186; *Wanek* v. *Winona*, 78 Minn. 98, 80 N. W. 851. Where there is no necessity for an examination, the injuries being internal, no examination will be required. *Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co.* v. *Gibbs*, 33 Tex. Civ. App. 214, 76 S. W. 71. It has been held that where there had been a previous examination by a physician of the defendant the plaintiff will not be compelled to submit to an examination by physicians appointed by the court. *Louisville & N. R. Co.* v. *McClain*, 23 Ky. L. 1878, 66 S. W. 391. Where the physician which the defendant asked to be appointed to examine the plaintiff was considered by the plaintiff hostile or unfriendly to him, it was held that such appointment would not be made. *Stack* v. *New York, N. H. & H. R. Co.*, 177 Mass. 155, 58 N. E. 686. The defendant has no right to compel the plaintiff to submit to an X-Ray photograph although there is express authority by statute to compel plaintiff to submit to a physical examination in such case. *State* v. *Call* (Fla.), 59 South. 789, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1071. But in such case, it seems, the physician in his examination may use an X-ray. *Ibid.* An examination which requires the use of drugs or anesthetics will not be allowed. *Strudgeon* v. *Sand Beach*, 107 Mich. 496, 65 N. W. 616. But it has been held that in an examination for injury to plaintiff's eyes that drugs may be used to dilate the pupils if such could be done without deleterious consequences. *Atchison, T. & S. F. F. Co.* v. *Palmore*, 68 Kan. 545, 75 Pac. 509.

EQUITY—CONVEYANCE IN CONSIDERATION OF FUTURE SUPPORT—RESCISSION.—Land was conveyed in consideration of future support recited in the deed. The grantees did not discharge their obligation, and a bill in equity was brought to charge the land with a lien for support and for general relief. *Held*, rescission is the plaintiff's proper remedy. *Grant* v. *Swank* (W. Va.), 81 S. E. 966. See NOTES, p. 146.

JUDGES—DISQUALIFICATION—RELATION TO PARTY IN INTEREST.—A statute provided that a judge shall be disqualified to sit in any case in which he is related to any party to said cause within the fourth degree. A son of a judge was counsel for one of the parties, his fee being contingent upon his winning the case. *Held*, he is a party within the meaning of the statute. *State* v. *Pitchford* (*Okla.*), 141 Pac. 433. See NOTES, p. 147.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS—TAXATION — PUBLIC ENTERPRISE.—The Legislature of Maine authorized cities of a certain class to operate munici-